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STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR
EMPLOYEE ACTIONS UNDER THE
WORKER ADJUSTMENT AND RETRAINING
NOTIFICATION ACT
INTRODUCTION
The sudden termination of a company's operations results in
devastating losses to the affected employees and their commu-
nities.' An unexpected plant closing hinders the workers' ability
to obtain alternative employment 2 and burdens state welfare
systems.3 In 1988, Congress responded to these concerns by
enacting the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification
Act (WARN). 4 WARN requires an employer5 to provide its
1. Economic Dislocation and Worker Adjustment Assistance Act: Hear-
ings on S. 538 Before the Subcomm. on Labor Management Relations of the
Senate Labor and Human Resources Comm., 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1987)
(statement of Owen Beiber, President, International Union, UAW); 133 CONG.
REc. E2443 (daily ed. July 14, 1988) (statement of Rep. Murphy); 134 CONG.
REc. 15,765 (1988) (statement of Sen. Metzenbaum); ANTONE ABOUD, NEW
YORK STATE SCHOOL OF INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS AT CORNELL UNI-
VERSITY, PLANT CLOSING LEGISLATION, at v (1984).
2. Effectiveness of the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification
Act: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources,
103d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1993) (statement of Linda Morra, General Accounting
Office) [hereinafter Effectiveness of WARN]. Employees often fail to seek
alternative employment when their employer closes its business without pro-
viding advance notice. Id.
3. See ABOUD, supra note 1, at v.
4. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2109 (Supp. 1993). The stated purpose of WARN
is to provide "some transition time to adjust to the prospective loss of
employment, to seek and obtain alternative jobs, and, if necessary, to enter
skill training or retraining that will allow these workers to successfully compete
on the job market." 20 C.F.R. § 639.1(a) (1993). See generally T.S. Lough,
WARN: The Rights, Duties and Obligations of Employers, Employees and
Unions, 42 LAB. L.J. 285 (1991) (discussing the legislative history of WARN);
John O'Connor, Employers Be Forewarned: An Employer's Guide to Plant
Closing and Layoff Decisions After the Enactment of the Worker Adjustment
and Retraining Notification Act, 16 OHIo N.U. L. REv. 19 (1989) (providing
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workers with written notice at least sixty days prior to shutting
down a plant 6 or instituting a mass layoff.7 Section 5 of the Act
allows employees to file suit in federal district court if their
employer fails to adhere to the advance notice requiremeit.8
Thus far, employees have invoked WARN sparingly, 9 but
several recent developments suggest that the number of lawsuits
under WARN will increase in the near future. Almost 7000
guidance in meeting the requirements of WARN to lawyers representing
management); Howard Weg, Introduction to Federal Regulation of Plant
Closings and Mass Layoffs, 94 CoM. L.J. 123 (1989) (interpreting each
provision of WARN in accordance with the regulations promulgated by the
Department of Labor).
5. WARN defines an "employer" as "any business enterprise that em-
ploys 100 or more employees, excluding part-time employees; or 100 or more
employees who in the aggregate work at least 4000 hours per week (exclusive
of hours of overtime)."
WARN § 2(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 2101(a)(1) (1988).
6. Plant closings covered by WARN include:
[T]he permanent or temporary shutdown of a single site of em-
ployment, . . . or one or more facilities or operating units within
a single site of employment, if the shutdown results in an em-
ployment loss at the single site of employment during any 30-day
period for 50 or inore employees excluding any part-time employ-
ees.
WARN § 2(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 2101(a)(2). The phrase "single site of employ-
ment" replaced "place of employment," which appeared in the original bill.
The change was intended to clarify that separate operations "are not to be
combined when determining whether the employment threshold for triggering
the notice requirement is met." H.R. REp. No. 576, 100th Cong., 2d Sess.
1046 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2078, 2079.
7. WARN defines a "mass layoff" as:
[A] reduction in force which -
(A) is not the result of a plant closing; and
(B) results in an employment loss at the single site of
employment during any 30-day period for -
(i) (I) at least 33 percent of the employees (excluding
any part-time employees); and
(II) at least 50 employees (excluding any part-time em-
ployees); or
(ii) at least 500 employees.
WARN § 2(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 2101(a)(3).
8. Section 5 of WARN states:
A person seeking to enforce such liability, including a represen-
tative of employees or a unit of local government aggrieved under
paragraph (1) or (3), may sue either for such person or for other
persons similarly situated, or both, in any district court of the
United States for any district in which the violation is alleged to
have occurred, or in which the employer transacts business.
WARN § 5(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 2104(a)(5).
9. As of September 1993, 94 lawsuits had been filed under WARN. Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 196, at D-8 (Oct. 13, 1993).
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LIMITATIONS PERIOD UNDER WARN
plants closed in 1990 and 1991 alone, 10 but less than 10% of
the affected workers received advance notice." Studies attribute
the scarcity of lawsuits in part to the fact that most employees
lack knowledge of their WARN rights. 2 Recently, Congress
agreed to consider implementing a program to educate workers
about WARN. 3 In 1993, members of Congress introduced bills
to amend WARN by broadening the Act's coverage1 4 and in-
creasing the damages available to employees.15 Also, courts have
interpreted the existing damage provision favorably to employ-
ees.' 6 A combination of these factors indicates that employees
will soon bring more WARN suits in federal courts.
As WARN suits become more common, various aspects of
the Act will likely require judicial interpretation. This Recent
Development addresses Congress's failure to provide a statute
of limitations for suits alleging violation of the advance notice
10. See Effectiveness of WARN, supra note 2, at 3.
11. Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 151, at D-10 (Aug. 3, 1993).
12. See Effectiveness of WARN, supra note 2, at 15.
13. Id. at 2. The education proposal was submitted to the Senate Com-
mittee on Labor Management Relations by Julie Hurwitz, Executive Director,
Sugar Law Center for Economic and Social Justice. Id. at 8.
14. On May 27, 1993, Rep. Ford (D-Mich.) introduced a bill (H.R. 2300)
which would extend WARN's notification period from 60 to 180 days. Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 103, at D-22 (June 1, 1993). Currently, WARN requires
advance notification of a mass layoff when there is an employment loss for
33% of employees and at least 50 workers, or for at least 500 employees.
WARN § 2(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 2101(a)(3). Representative Ford's bill would
eliminate the 33% requirement and lower the layoff threshold from 50 to 25
workers. Daily Lab. Rep. No. 103, supra. The bill would also afford the
Labor Department the power to sue to enforce WARN. Id.
In a draft proposal distributed to employment lawyers and members of
Congress, the Department of Labor favored changes to WARN. Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA) No. 175, at D-9 (Sept. 13, 1993). One of the changes advocated
by the Department of Labor was to lower the employee threshold in a manner
similar to that proposed by Rep. Ford. Id. Senator Howard Metzenbaum is
presently drafting legislation to make WARN more effective. Id.
15. Pursuant to Rep. Ford's bill, attorney's fees would be mandatory for
prevailing plaintiffs. Daily Lab. Rep. No. 103, supra note 14.
16. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. North Star Steel Co., 5 F.3d 39
(3d Cir. 1993). The court determined that an employer that laid off its
employees in violation of WARN is liable for back pay to each aggrieved
employee for each day of the violation, regardless of whether or not that day
would have been a regular work day for that employee. Id. at 42-43. The
court also held that successful employees should recover attorney's fees from
their employer unless special circumstances render such an award unjust. Id.
at 44. The court rejected the employer's argument that WARN allows em-
ployees to recover attorney's fees only when the employer litigates in bad
faith. Id. See also Solberg v. Inline Corp., 740 F. Supp. 680, 687 (D. Minn.
1990) (holding that an employer that successfully defended a WARN suit
could not collect attorney's fees from its former employees because the suit
was not frivolous, baseless, or unreasonable).
1994]
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requirement. In the first federal court of appeals decision to
rule on the appropriate statute of limitations, 17 the Second
Circuit in United Paperworkers International Union Local 340
v. Specialty Paperboard, Inc. 8 held that the limitation period
governing state contract actions applies to WARN. 9
Part I of this Recent Development describes the history and
parameters of WARN. Part II discusses the means by which
federal courts generally determine the statute of limitations for
federal laws which provide no specific limitation period. Part
III explains the Second Circuit's decision in Specialty Paper-
board. Part IV analyzes the Second Circuit's decision and con-
cludes that the court incorrectly applied a state statute of
limitations for the federal cause of action under section 4 of
WARN. Part V proposes a congressional amendment to WARN
that adopts a three-year limitation period in accordance with
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA),20 a
statute which is similar to WARN.
I. PARAMETERS AND HISTORY OF WARN
Historically, the common law employment at will doctrine
afforded employers the absolute right to close a factory.2' In
1935, Congress enacted the National Labor Relations Act(NLRA)," which provided two potential sources for restraining
an employer's ability to cease operations. First, section 8(a)(3)
prohibits the termination of employees to discourage union
activityY3 Second, section 8(a)(5) requires employers to bargain
with unions regarding the terms and conditions of employment. 24
17. United Paperworkers Int'l Union Local 340 v. Specialty Paperboard,
Inc., 999 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1993). The court explained that no court of appeals
had decided the issue. Id. at 54.
Several district courts have addressed the issue, with varying results. Com-
pare Automobile Mechanics' Local No. 701 v. Santa Fe Terminal Services,
Inc., 830 F. Supp. 432, 437 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (rejecting the NLRA statute of
limitations for WARN actions but refusing to rule on the appropriate limitation
period); Frymire v. Ampex Corp., 821 F. Supp. 651, 654-55 (D. Colo. 1993)(applying a state contract statute of limitations to WARN); Wallace v. Detroit
Coke Corp., 818 F. Supp. 192, 196 (E.D. Mich. 1993) (applying six-year state
contract statute of limitations to WARN and finding the six-month statute of
limitations provided by the NLRA inapplicable); with Staudt v. Glastron, Inc.,
1993 WL 85356, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 23, 1993) (holding that the NLRA
statute of limitations governs WARN); Newspaper & Mail Deliverers' Union
v. United Magazine Co., 809 F. Supp. 185, 191 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (same).
18. 999 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1993).
19. Id. at 57.
20. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
21. See FRANcIs A. O'CONNELL, JR., PLANT CLOSINGs 1 (1986).
22. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1988).
23. Id. § 158(a)(3).
24. Id. § 158(a)(5).https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol46/iss1/14
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The United States Supreme Court interpreted these provisions
as offering only limited protection from plant closings. In Textile
Workers v. Darlington Manufacturing Co.,2 the Court held that
an employer may close its entire business without violating
section 8(a)(3), even if motivated solely by anti-union consid-
erations.2 In First National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 27 the
Court held that section 8(a)(5) does not require an employer to
bargain with a union regarding the decision to close a plant.28
The Supreme Court's interpretations of the NLRA rendered the
Act fairly ineffective in altering an employer's common-law right
to terminate a factory's operations.
Plant closing legislation failed to gain majority support in
every session of Congress from 1973 to 1987.29 In 1985, the
25. 380 U.S. 263 (1965).
26. Id. at 269-70. The Court explained that an employer's decisions con-
cerning the closing or relocation of its operations are so peculiarly matters of
management prerogative that such decisions are not unfair labor practices
under § 8(a)(3). The Darlington decision, however, is limited to complete
closings. Id. at 275. The Court noted a partial plant closing may constitute a
violation of § 8(a)(3), and promulgated a list of controlling standards to
determine if a less than complete shutdown unlawfully discriminates against
union employees. Id. at 275-76. The primary factors to be considered are:
[Whether] the persons having control over a plant being closed
for anti-union reasons (1) have an interest in another business,
whether or not affiliated with or engaged in the same line of
commercial activity as the closed plant, or sufficient substantiality
to give promise of their reaping a benefit from the discouragement
of unionization in that business; (2) act to close their plant with
the purpose of producing such a result; and (3) occupy a relation-
ship to the other business which makes it realistically foreseeable
that its employees will fear that such business will also be closed
down if they persist in organizational activities.
Id. Cf. Illinois Coil Spring Co., Milwaukee Spring Div. (Milwaukee Spring
II), 268 N.L.R.B. 601 (1984) (holding that an employer's transfer of work to
another plant, to other employees within the same plant, or to a subcontractor
is not necessarily a violation of the NLRA).
27. 451 U.S. 666 (1981).
28. Id. at 686. The Court explained that the decision to terminate opera-
tions is similar to the decision whether to go into business at all. Id. The
Court analogized the case to Darlington. Id. See supra note 25 and accom-
panying text for a discussion of Darlington. See also Dubuque Packing Co.
II, 303 N.L.R.B. 386 (1991) (holding that, in some cases, an employer is
required to bargain over the decision to relocate work). See generally THE
DEVELOPING LABOR LAw 859-61 (Patrick Hardin et al. eds., 3d ed. 1992)
(summarizing First Nat'l Maint. Corp. v. NLRB); WAYNE R. WENDLING, THE
PLANT CLosuRu POLICY Dm.EmmA: LABOR, LAW AND BARAINING 77-99 (1984)
(proposing that an employer should be required to inform the NLRB prior to
ordering a plant closing and the employer should be obligated to bargain with
a union if the Board determines that the reasons for the closure are such that
collective bargaining may be beneficial).
29. See BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAms, PLANT CLOsINGs: THE COMPLETE
19941
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House of Representatives defeated a bill which attempted to
overrule First National Maintenance by requiring employers to
bargain with employees before closing a plant.3 0 In 1987, the
Senate Labor Committee introduced a bill requiring employers
to provide three to six months advance notice of plant closings.',
The Senate included the proposal in the Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act, which President Reagan vetoed. 2 In 1988,
RESOURCE GuIDE 1 (1988) [hereinafter BuREAu OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS]. The
first major piece of federal legislation offered to regulate an employer's right
to close a plant was proposed by former Senator Walter Mondale in 1973.
134 CONG. REc. 15,760 (1988) (statement of Sen. Hatch). The bill presented
by Sen. Mondale would have established a National Employment Relocation
Administration to oversee changes in business operations in the United States.
Id. at 15,760-61. The Mondale bill required employers with more than 50
employees to provide workers 2 years advance notice of the employer's intent
to close a plant or transfer work. Id. at 15,761.
Several states have successfully enacted plant closing legislation. See CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51o (West 1987) (covering companies with 100 or more
employees and requiring employers to pay for the continuation of existing
group health insurance for terminated employees); HAw. REV. STAT. § 39413-
9 (Supp. 1992) (mandating 45 days written advance notice of plant closing,
partial closing, or relocation to each affected employee and the director of
labor relations for employers with 50 or more employees); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 26, § 625-B (1988 & West Supp. 1993) (requiring employers with at
least 100 employees to provide 60 days advance notice and severance pay to
any employee with three or more years of service); MAss. ANN. LAws ch.
151A, §§ 71A-71G (Law. Co-op. 1989) (providing voluntary advance notice
of a plant closing or layoff to the director of the division of employment
security); MICH. ComP. LAws ANN. § 450.736 (West 1990) (encouraging
employers to give advance notice as early as possible to the department of
labor, affected employees, any employee representatives, and the affected
community); S.C. CODE ANN. § 41-1-40 (Law. Co-op. 1986) (providing that
any employer that requires its employees to give notice before quitting a job
must post advance written notice of its purpose to quit work or shutdown,
the date of cessation, and the expected duration of cessation in every room
of the plant); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 50-1-601 to -604 (1991) (requiring noti-
fication of a plant closing for employers that employ more than 50 workers
and are planning to reduce the workforce by 50 or more during any 3 month
period); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 109.07 (West 1989) (mandating 60 days advance
notice to the department of labor, affected employees, union representatives,
and the affected community).
30. The bill was proposed by Rep. Ford. See O'CONNELL, supra note 21,
at 6. The bill was introduced as the Labor Management Notification and
Consultation Act. Id. It was voted down 208-203. Id. The bill's stated purpose
was "to require employers to notify and consult with employees before ordering
a plant closing or permanent layoff." Id.
31. See BuREu OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, supra note 29, at 10. The bill was
introduced by Sens. Metzenbaum (D-Ohio), Kennedy (D-Mass.), and Simon
(D-Ill.) as the Economic Dislocation and Worker Adjustment Act on February
19, 1987. 133 CONG. REc. 3725 (1987). The bill called for at least 90 days
advance notice of any plant closing and covered employers with 50 or more
employees. Id. The bill also established federally-funded worker training
programs for affected employees. Id.
32. See BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, supra note 29, at 13.
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Democratic members of Congress separated the plant closing
provision from the trade bill and introduced WARN as a free-
standing proposal. 3 The bill passed both houses of Congress3 4
despite vigorous opposition from Republicans.3 5 WARN became
law in August 1988 without President Reagan's signature. 36
WARN requires employers with 100 or more employees to
provide affected workers37 or their union38 and government
officials3 9 at least 60 days advance written notice of any plant
closing or mass layoff.40 An employer may avoid liability by
33. 134 CONG. REC. 15,000 (1988). WARN was introduced by Sen. Metz-
enbaum. Id.
34. The Senate passed WARN by a vote of 72-23. 134 CONG. REc. 16,691
(1988). The House of Representatives passed the bill by a vote of 286-136.
134 CONG. REc. 17,879 (1988).
35. See 134 CONG. REc. 15,515 (1988) (statement of Sen. Dole); 134 CONG.
REc. 15,521 (1988) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
36. See Weg, supra note 4, at 123. The effective date of WARN was
February 4, 1988. 29 U.S.C. § 2101 (1988).
37. "Affected employees" include "employees who may reasonably be
expected to experience an employment loss as a consequence of a proposed
plant closing or mass layoff by their employer." WARN § 2(a)(5), 29 U.S.C.
§ 2101(a)(5). One court stated that workers who have been laid off for several
years without receiving notice of recall are not affected employees. Damron
v. Rob Fork Mining Corp.,'945 F.2d 121 (6th Cir. 1991). But cf. Kildea v.
Electro Wire Products, Inc., 792 F. Supp. 1046, 1046 (E.D. Mich. 1992)
(holding that an employer was required to provide advance notice of a plant
closing to employees who had been laid off for less than six months). See
also Jones v. Kayser-Roth Hosiery, Inc., 748 F. Supp. 1292 (E.D. Tenn. 1990)
(concluding that workers on temporary layoff qualified as affected employees
when they had a reasonable expectation of recall).
38. The Act states that the employer shall serve notice upon each repre-
sentative of the affected employees. WARN § 3(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 2102(a)(1).
The Act defines a "representative" as an exclusive representative under the
NLRA. WARN § 2(a)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 2101(a)(4).
39. WARN requires notice to "unit[s] of local government." WARN §
3(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 2102(a)(2). A unit of local government is "any general
purpose political subdivision of a State which has the power to levy taxes and
spend funds, as well as general corporate and police powers." WARN §
2(a)(7), 29 U.S.C. § 2101(a)(7). WARN also allows local governments to sue
to enforce the advance notice requirement. WARN § 5(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. §
2104(a)(5). On July 15, 1993, the city of Portage, Pennsylvania filed what is
believed to be the first WARN suit in which a unit of local government acted
as plaintiff. Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 164, at D-8 (Aug. 26, 1993). The
suit *as filed against Pennshire Stores, Inc. in the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Pennsylvania. Id. If successful, the city could recover
damages in the amount of $500 for each day the employer failed to give
notice. WARN § 5(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 2104(a)(3).
40. WARN § 3(a), 29 U.S.C. § 2102(a). See also supra notes 6-7 for
definitions of "plant closing" and "mass layoff." One court held that an
employer was not obligated to provide notice at the first sign of economic
downturn in order to avoid liability for failure to give 60 days advance notice.
Chestnut v. Stone Forest Indus., Inc., 817 F. Supp. 932, 937 (N.D. Fla. 1993).
1994] 329
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demonstrating either that it acted in good faith4' or that unfo-
reseeable occurrences 42 necessitated the plant closing. Workers
alleging a violation of WARN may file suit in a federal district
court sitting in either the state in which the plant closed or any
state where the employer transacts business .41
See also Oil Workers Int'l Union Local 7-515 v. American Home Prod. Corp.,
790 F. Supp. 1441, 1448 (N.D. Ind. 1992) (determining that an employer
complied with WARN when it served notice of a plant closing on the union
local's vice president rather than president because the president received a
copy of the notice on the day it was released).
41. Section 3 of WARN provides:
An employer may order the shutdown of a single site of employ-
ment before the conclusion of the 60-day period if as of the time
that notice would have been required the employer was actively
seeking capital or business which, if obtained, would have enabled
the employer to avoid or postpone the shutdown and the employer
reasonably and in good faith believed that giving the notice
required would have precluded the employer from obtaining the
needed capital or business.
WARN § 3(b)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 2102(b)(1). This provision was included in
WARN in response to concerns expressed by some members of Congress that
the advance notice requirement would cause financially-troubled firms to cease
operations rather than seek sources of income which would allow them to
remain active. 133 CoGro. R~c. E2414 (daily ed. July 14, 1988) (statement of
Rep. Rowland).
42. Section 3 of WARN provides: "An employer may order a plant closing
or mass layoff before the conclusion of the 60-day period if the closing or
mass layoff is caused by business circumstances that were not reasonably
foreseeable as of the time that notice would have been required." WARN §
3(b)(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 2102(b)(2)(A).
Employers have generally been successful in using this provision to avoid
liability. See International Ass'n of Machinists v. General Dynamics Corp.,
821 F. Supp. 1306, 1312 (E.D. Mo. 1993) (holding that a defense contractor
did not violate WARN by failing to give advance notice of a mass layoff
when the layoff was caused by the unforeseeable cancellation of a defense
contract); Chestnut v. Stone Forest Indus., Inc., 817 F. Supp. 932, 936 (N.D.
Fla. 1993) (concluding that mass layoffs did not require advance notice when
they were due to a drastic drop in the price of employer's product); Jones v.
Kayser-Roth Hosiery, Inc., 748 F. Supp. 1292, 1302 (E.D. Tenn. 1990)
(determining that a plant closure was the result of unforeseeable business
circumstances when the employer's major customer withdrew its account). But
cf. Carpenters Dist. Council v. Dillard Dep't Stores, Inc., 778 F. Supp. 297,
305-06 (E.D. La. 1991) (rejecting an employer's argument that uncertainty
about the date on which the Securities Exchange Commission would approve
a corporate merger constituted an unforeseeable business circumstance).
WARN also allows employers to close a plant or institute a mass layoff
without providing advance notice if the plant closure or layoff is caused by
natural disasters. WARN § 3(b)(2)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 2102(b)(2)(B).
43. The venue provision of WARN states: "A person seeking to enforce
such liability, including a representative of employees or a unit of local
government ... may sue ... in any district court of the United States for
any district in which the violation is alleged to have occurred, or in which the
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol46/iss1/14
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Employees who prove that their employer failed to provide
advance notice may recover back pay for sixty days and attor-
ney's fees."
II. JuDcIAL FRAmEWORK FOR DETERKMNING STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS
Numerous federal laws lack a specific statute of limitations. 45
Federal courts generally borrow a limitation period from state
law to supplement deficient federal statutes." This "state-bor-
rowing" doctrine dates back to 1830, when the Supreme Court
cited the Rules of Decisions Act for the proposition that a
limitation period from state law should apply to federal causes
employer transacts business." WARN § 5(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 2104(a)(5). Under
this provision, an employer may be sued in any district where the company
has a facility or an office, or where it sells its products. See generally
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) (describing the
minimum contacts necessary for a party to have with a state in order to
impose liability on the party in that state).
44. WARN § 5(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 2104(a)(1). For a discussion of how this
provision has been interpreted by the courts, see supra note 16 and accom-
panying text.
45. See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78
(1988); Investment Advisors Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80 (1988 & Supp. IV
1992); Trademark Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (1988); Labor-Management
Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1988); Labor-Management Reporting
and Disclosure Act of 1959, 29 U.S.C. § 412 (1988); Rehabilitation Act of
1973, 29 U.S.C. § 791 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992); Employee Retirement and
Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992);
Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992); Civil Rights
Act of 1877, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992); Clean
Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992); Railway Labor Act, 45
U.S.C. § 182 (1988); Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, 49 U.S.C. § 1552(d)(1)
(1988).
Federal civil causes of action arising under a federal statute enacted after
December 1, 1990 that do not contain a statute of limitations are covered by
the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, which provides: "Except as otherwise
provided by law, a civil action arising under an Act of Congress enacted after
the date of the enactment of this section may not be commenced later than
four years after the cause of action accrues." 28 U.S.C. § 1658 (Supp. IV
1992). See generally Patrick McDowell, Note, Limitation Periods for Federal
Causes of Action After the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, 44 VAND. L.
REV. 1355 (1991) (discussing the legislative history of the Act).
46. See Reed v. United Transp. Union, 488 U.S. 319, 324 (1989) (noting
that state law usually supplies a statute of limitations for a federal statute
lacking a limitation period); Agency Holding v. Malley-Duff & Associates,
Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 147 (1987) (same); Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266-
67 (1985) (same). See generally Ellen E. Kaulbach, A Functional Approach to
Borrowing Limitations Periods for Federal Statutes, 77 CAL. L. REV. 133
(1989).
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of action containing no statute of limitations. 47 Under the state-
borrowing doctrine, federal courts characterize the federal claim
at issue and apply the statute of limitations from the most
analogous state-law claim.48 For example, in Wilson v. Garcia,49
the Supreme Court invoked the state-borrowing doctrine and
characterized suits under section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act
of 1871 as tort actions.5 0 Consequently, the timeliness of a
complaint filed under section 1983 is governed by the statute of
limitations for personal injury actions under the law of the state
in which the claim arose.5'
The Supreme Court, however, has rejected the state-borrowing
doctrine for federal causes of action susceptible to multiple
characterizations.5 2 In such cases, federal courts borrow a statute
47. M'Cluny v. Silliman, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 270, 277 (1830). The Rules of
Decisions Act provided: "[T]hat the laws of the several states, except where
the constitution, treaties, or statutes of the United States shall otherwise
require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at common
law, in the courts of the United States, in cases where they apply." Id. The
Rules of Decision Act is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1988). See generally
Charles Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of
1789, 37 HARv. L. Rnv. 49 (1923) (arguing that the Rules of Decisions Act
does not necessarily require state-borrowing).
48. See Agency Holding, 483 U.S. at 147. The Court explained that "the
characterization of a federal claim for purposes of selecting the appropriate
statute of limitations is generally a question of federal law." Id. at 147-48.
See also Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 483-84 (1980) (describing
the state-borrowing doctrine).
49. 471 U.S. 261 (1985).
50. Id. at 267.
51. Id. at 265-66. See generally Julie Davies, In Search of the "Paradig-
matic Wrong?". Selecting a Limitations Period for Section 1983, 36 KAN. L.
REv. 133 (1987).
52. See Agency Holding, 483 U.S. at 147. The Agency Holding Court
borrowed the four-year statute of limitations of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 15b (1988), for suits under the Racketeering Influence and Corruption Act
(RICO), 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (1988). 483 U.S. at 156. The Court deemed state-
borrowing inappropriate because RICO "encompasses numerous topics and
subtopics" and therefore may not be not be characterized uniformly by courts.
Id. at 149. The Court explained that while the state-borrowing doctrine has
provided the general rule,
[W]hen a rule from elsewhere in federal law clearly provides a
closer analogy than available state statutes, and when the federal
policies at stake and the practicalities of litigation make that rule
a significantly more appropriate vehicle for interstitial lawmaking,
[the Court] has not hesitated to turn away from state law.
Id. at 148 (citations omitted). See also DelCostello v. International Brotherhood
of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151 (1983). In DelCostello, the Court refused to invoke
the state-borrowing doctrine and held that the statute of limitations provided
by the NLRA applied to suits alleging violation of the duty of fair represen-
tation under the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. § 185
(1988). Id. at 169.https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol46/iss1/14
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of limitations from an analogous federal statute.53 The Court
also advocates federal-borrowing when state-borrowing creates
the possibility of forum shopping.5 4 In Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind,
Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson,5 the Court explained that the
"practicalities of litigation," including the potential for forum
shopping and the possibility of multiple characterizations, some-
times require federal-borrowing, but only when a federal statute
clearly provides a closer analogy to the deficient federal claim
than state alternatives.5 6
III. SECOND Ciacurr REsPONSE: Specialty Paperboard
In United Paperworkers International Union Local 340 v.
Specialty Paperboard, Inc. '1 7 the Second Circuit Court of Ap-
53. See Agency Holding, 483 U.S. at 147 (holding that the Clayton Act
statute of limitations should be used for RICO); DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 169
(using the NLRA statute of limitations). See also Occidental Life Ins. Co. v.
EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 368 (1977) (adopting a federal statute of limitations for
EEOC enforcement actions); McAllister v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 357 U.S.
221, 224 (1958) (applying a federal statute of limitations to action under
federal admiralty law); Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 396 (1946)
(declining to apply the state-borrowing doctrine).
54. See Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 111 S.
Ct. 2773, 2779 (1991). The Court noted that in some circumstances, "[T]he
use of state statutes would present the danger of forum shopping." Id. (quoting
Agency Holding, 483 U.S. at 154). Forum shopping is when litigants attempt
to have their cases moved to jurisdictions where they might receive more
favorable decisions. Stephen W. Bialkowski, Note, State Limitations Period
For Personal Injury Actions Applies to All Section 1983 Claims, 16 SETON
HALL L. Rnv. 831, 848 (1986). Logically, most litigants will try procedurally
to move their cases to jurisdictions with longer statutes of limitations. Id.
55. 111 S. Ct. 2773 (1991).
56. Id. at 2778. The Court explained that "federal-borrowing [is] a closely
circumscribed exception to be made only ... when the federal policies at
stake and the practicalities of litigation make that rule a significantly more
appropriate vehicle for interstitial lawmaking." Id. Citing Wilson and Agency
Holding, the Court announced a three-part inquiry to determine whether a
federal court should apply federal-borrowing. Id. The inquiry requires a court
to consider whether a uniform statute of limitations is to be selected because
the federal statute at issue is susceptible to multiple characterizations, whether
application of state law would encourage forum shopping, and whether an
analogous federal law provides a closer analogy to the deficient federal statute
than state alternatives. Id. at 2779.
The Lampf Court concluded that suits under § 10(b) of the Security
Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78, should be governed by the one and two year
limitation periods explicitly provided in §§ 9 and 18 of the Act. 111 S. Ct. at
2781.
The Court applied its holding retroactively, which resulted in the dismissal
of numerous complaints. See Jill E. Fisch, As Time Goes By: New Questions
About the Statute of Limitations for Rule 10b-5, 61 FORDHAm L. REv. S1O,
SI0-11 (1993).
57. 999 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1993).
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peals held that the statute of limitations for state law contract
suits applied to WARN." The court considered applying a
limitation period from an analogous federal law, but determined
that the practicalities of litigation under WARN do not require
federal-borrowing 9 Moreover, the court held that no federal
statute provides a closer analogy to WARN than available state
alternatives.60
The Specialty Paperboard litigation resulted from the sale of
a Vermont paper mill. 61 On the day of the completed transaction,
the seller terminated all 232 of the mill's workers.62 The buyer
rehired 141 of the employees on the day of the sale. 63 Nearly
one year later, the United Paperworkers International Union
filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of
Vermont under WARN on behalf of the laid-off employees 4
The union alleged that both the seller and purchaser violated
WARN by failing to give the workers sixty days advance written
notice of the impending layoffs.6 5 The defendants urged the
district court to dismiss the complaint as time-barred, arguing
that the NLRA six-month statute of limitations governs WARN
actions. The union responded by urging the court to adopt a
limitation period from state law or the Fair Labor Standards
Act (FLSA).67
The Second Circuit found neither the NLRA nor the FLSA
closely analogous to WARN. 68 The court acknowledged that
both the NLRA and WARN regulate relations between an
58. Id. at 57.
59. Id. at 54-55.
60. Id. at 56-57.
61. Appellee's Brief at 3. On March 15, 1991, Specialty Paperboard, Inc.
sold its paper mill in Sheldon Springs, Vermont to the Rock-Tenn Corporation.
Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. The employees' representative filed suit on March 13, 1993. Ap-
pellee's Brief at 3. When the plant was sold, Specialty Paperboard's hourly
employees were represented by the United Paperworkers International Union
Local No. 340, but there was no collective bargaining agreement in effect. Id.
The union filed suit because more than one-third of the employees suffered
an "employment loss." Id. Under WARN, an employment loss is any loss of
employment in excess of six months. 20 C.F.R. § 639.3(f) (1993).
65. Appellee's Brief at 3.
66. Appellant's Brief at 2-3. The NLRA provides a six-month statute of
limitations. 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1988).
67. Appellee's Brief at 4 n.1, 6. The FLSA requires employers to pay
employees a minimum wage set by Congress. 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1988 & Supp.
IV 1992). The FLSA provides a three-year statute of limitations for willful
violations. 29 U.S.C. § 255 (1988).
68. 999 F.2d at 55.https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol46/iss1/14
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employer and its employees, but explained that the NLRA serves
solely to protect the right of employees to join labor unions
and engage in collective bargaining with their employers.6 9 In
contrast, Congress passed WARN in order to alleviate the
distress associated with plant closings for all workers: 0 Unlike
the NLRA, the court reasoned, WARN's coverage extends to
workers who display no interest in joining a labor union.7'
Enforcement procedures differ under the NLRA, the FLSA,
and WARN. The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB)
enforces the NLRA,7 2 and an administrative structure enforces
the FLSA.73 Private civil actions constitute the sole enforcement
mechanism under WARN.7 4 Therefore, the Specialty Paperboard
court concluded that neither the NLRA nor the FLSA provided
a close analogy to WARN.75
Furthermore, the court concluded that the practicalities of
litigation fail to mandate application of a uniform, federal
statute of limitations for WARN.76 The court reasoned that
WARN suits are not subject to multiple characterizations be-
cause the statute simply requires employers to provide advance
notice of a plant closing.7 7 The court also rejected the notion
that state-borrowing would encourage employees to forum shop,
although forum shopping is theoretically possible .7
As the Specialty Paperboard court noted, WARN's venue
provision could, in theory, allow plaintiffs to forum shop.79
Employees alleging that their employer violated the advance
69. Id. at 54.
70. Id. See also supra note 4 and accompanying text for a statement of
the purpose of WARN.
71. 999 F.2d at 54.
72. 29 U.S.C. § 153 (1988).
73. 29 U.S.C. § 204 (1988). The FLSA is enforced by the Wage and Hour
Division of the Department of Labor. Id.
74. See supra note 8 and accompanying text for a discussion of WARN's
enforcement provision.
75. 999 F.2d at 55.
76. Id. at 55-56. See supra note 56 and accompanying text for an expla-
nation of why the practicalities of litigation must be considered when deter-
mining the appropriate statute of limitations for a federal civil action arising
under a congressional enactment lacking a specific limitation period.
77. 999 F.2d at 56. The court contrasted WARN with RICO, which
provides grounds for a variety of causes of action. Id. See supra note 52 and
accompanying text discussing the Agency Holding case in which the Court
determined that the state-borrowing doctrine was inappropriate for RICO
because that statute is susceptible to multiple characterizations.
78. 999 F.2d at 56.
79. Id. For a definition of "forum shopping," see Biakowski, supra note
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notice, requirement may file suit in a district court sitting in
either the state in which the plant closed or in any state where
the employer does business. 0 Limitation periods under state law
vary by jurisdiction."' Consequently, applying the state-borrow-
ing doctrine to WARN could allow employees to forum shop if
the limitation period under the law of the state in which the
plant closed is shorter than the time period under the law of a
state in which the employer conducts business. 2
Despite this theoretical possibility, the Specialty Paperboard
court concluded that use of a state statute of limitations to
supplement WARN does not actually encourage forum shop-
ping.83 The court stated that even if employees file suit in a
district court located outside the state in which the alleged
violation occurred, choice of law rules will require the court to
apply the law of the state where the plant closing occurred.84
Accordingly, the statute of limitations provided by the law of
the state where the actionable event occurred determines the
timeliness of the complaint, regardless of where the employees
file suit.85
After finding federal-borrowing inappropriate under WARN,
the Specialty Paperboard court characterized WARN suits as
state law contract actions,8 6 and thus held that Vermont's six-
year statute of limitations governed the timeliness of the union's
complaint.8 7 The court explained that in Vermont, workers'
compensation claims are subject to the state's contract statute
of limitations.8 8 According to the court, both WARN and work-
ers' compensation laws seek to protect workers from unexpected
joblessness.89 The court refused to characterize WARN suits as
tort claims, noting that a tort plaintiff must prove negligence
or wrongful conduct, whereas an employee may recover under
80. See supra note 43 and accompanying text for a discussion of WARN's
venue provision.
81. With respect to state statutes of limitations for contract suits, see, e.g.,
ALA. CODE § 6-2-34 (1977) (six years); ALAsKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 45 § 101
(Sept. 1986) (four years); CAL. LAB. CODE § 2855 (West 1989) (seven years);
GA. CODE ANN. § 9-3-25 (1982) (four years); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, para.
13-205 (1991) (five years); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 260, § 2 (West 1992)
(six years).
82. Many American businesses have contacts in more than one state such
that WARN actions could be brought in a number of states.
83. 999 F.2d at 56 n.9.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 57.
87. Id.
88. 999 F.2d at 57 (citing Hartman v. Ouellette Plumbing & Heating
Corp., 507 A.2d 952, 953 (Vt. 1985)).
89. Id. at 57.https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol46/iss1/14
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WARN simply by showing that their employer closed its plant
without providing the requisite advance notice.9
IV. EVALUATION
In Specialty Paperboard, the Second Circuit erroneously con-
cluded that the state-borrowing doctrine adequately serves the
federal policies manifested in WARN. Despite the court's asser-
tion to the contrary, WARN's expansive venue provision allows
employees to forum shop if federal courts borrow a limitation
period from state law. 9' Consequently, Congress should amend
WARN to include a uniform statute of limitations applicable in
all jurisdictions.
A. Rationale for Uniform Federal Statute of Limitations
Under state law, the statute of limitations for contract actions
varies by jurisdiction.Y The Specialty Paperboard court noted
that WARN's expansive venue provision arguably allows em-
ployees to shop for a favorable forum. 9 Nevertheless, the court
concluded that choice of law rules require federal courts to
apply the statute of limitations provided under the law of the
state in which the plant closed. 94
Indeed, if all federal courts adhered to such a rule, the state-
borrowing doctrine as applied to WARN would not allow em-
ployees to forum shop. The Specialty Paperboard court, how-
ever, simply ignored the decisions explicitly rejecting the argument
that a federal court must apply the statute of limitations pro-
vided by the law of the state in which the actionable event
occurred. 9 In Champion International Corp. v. United Paper-
workers International Union,9 the Sixth Circuit applied a Ten-
nessee limitation period even though the actionable event occurred
in Mississippi. 97
90. Id.
91. See infra notes 93-101 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
possibility of forum shopping under WARN.
92. See supra note 81 for an illustration of state law contract statutes of
limitations which vary in length.
93. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
94. See supra notes 77-83 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Specialty Paperboard.
95. See Edelman v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 861 F.2d 1291 (1st Cir. 1988)
(applying the statute of limitations provided by the law of the forum state
rather than the state in which the claim arose); Champion Int'l Corp. v.
United Paperworkers Int'l Union, 779 F.2d 328 (6th Cir. 1985) (same).
96. 779 F.2d 328 (6th Cir. 1985).
97. Id. at 334.
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In Champion International, an employer filed suit in the
United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee
seeking to vacate an arbitration award under section 301 of the
Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA). 9s The dispute arose
out of a change in the work schedule at the employer's plant
in Mississippi.99 The union sought dismissal of the suit and
urged the district court to apply Mississippi's limitation period. °°
The Sixth Circuit rejected the union's argument, holding that
the district court correctly applied Tennessee's ninety-day statute
of limitations for a suit seeking to vacate an arbitration award. 10'
The Champion International court noted that Tennessee's
choice of law rules would require application of the Mississippi
statute of limitations. °2 The court, however, refused to adopt
the forum state's choice of law principles. 03 Instead, the Sixth
98. Id. at 329. The LMRA does not contain a specific statute of limitations.
In DelCostello, the Supreme Court held that actions under the LMRA alleging
a breach of the duty of fair representation are governed by the six-month
limitation period provided by the NLRA. 462 U.S. at 169. See supra note 52
for a discussion of DelCostello.
99. 779 F.2d at 330.
100. Id. at 331.
101. Id. at 334.
102. Id. at 331. Tennessee's choice of law rules would have required the
court to apply the Mississippi statute of limitations due to Tennessee's "bor-
rowing statute." Id. The borrowing statute provided: "Where the statute of
limitations of another state or government has created a bar to an action
upon a cause accruing therein, while the party to be charged was a resident
in such state or such government, the bar is equally effectual in this state."
TENN. CODE ANN. § 28-1-112 (1980).
103. 779 F.2d at 334. Federal subject matter jurisdiction is generally based
on either diversity of citizenship or questions arising under federal law. 28
U.S.C. §§ 1331-1332 (1988). In cases in which jurisdiction is based upon
diversity of citizenship, federal courts must apply the choice of law principles
of the forum state, i.e., the state in which the federal court sits, to identify
the state whose law will apply. Klaxon v. Stentor Elec. Mfg., 313 U.S. 487,
496 (1941). When jurisdiction is based upon matters arising under federal law,
a federal court is not required to follow the forum state's conflicts of law
principles. UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 705 n.8 (1966).
The Champion International court was not required to follow the Klaxon rule
because the case arose under the LMRA, a federal statute. 779 F.2d at 332.
Nevertheless, some federal courts apply the forum state's choice of law rules
even when subject matter jurisdiction is based on matters arising under federal
law. See, e.g., Loveridge v. Dreagoux, 678 F.2d 870 (10th Cir. 1982) (applying
the forum state's choice of law rules in a suit under § 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act).
Historically, state choice of law rules required application of the forum
state's statute of limitations. EUoENE SCOLES & PETER HAY, CONFLICT OF
LAWS 58 (1992). This rule resulted from the generally accepted theory that
statutes of limitations were procedural, and a court should apply the procedural
rules of the forum state, even if the substantive law governing the case ishttps://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol46/iss1/14
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Circuit borrowed Tennessee's longer limitation period even though
the claim arose in Mississippic 4
Similarly, in Edelman v. Chase Manhattan Bank,0 5 the First
Circuit applied the law of the forum state to determine the
timeliness of the complaint although many of the events leading
to the claim occurred in a different jurisdiction.106 In reaching
its decision, the Edelman court invoked certain principles of the
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws (Restatement). 0 7 The
derived from a different state. ROBERT A. LEFLAR ET AL., AMERICAN CONFLICTS
LAWS § 121, at 331 (4th ed. 1986). See generally Margaret Rosso Grossman,
Statutes of Limitation and the Conflict of Laws: Modern Analysis, 1980 Auz.
ST. L.J. 1.
Application of the forum state's limitation period, however, may encourage
forum shopping if the forum's statute of limitations is longer than that
provided by the law of the state in which the claim arose. SCOLEs & HAY,
supra, at 59. Consequently, two developments, one judicial and the other
legislative, altered the historical rule that a court must apply the statute of
limitations of the forum state. Judicially, some courts have begun to charac-
terize statutes of limitations as substantive rather than procedural. Id. at 60.
Usually, this occurs when the statute of limitations provided by the law under
which the claim arose is intended to extinguish the right and not merely the
remedy. Id. For example, limitations in wrongful death statutes and share-
holder liability statutes are frequently characterized as substantive. Id. Legis-
latively, the majority of states have enacted borrowing statutes which provide
that a cause of action will be time-barred in the forum state if it is time-
barred in the state in which the claim arose. Id. at 61-62.
104. 779 F.2d at 334.
105. 861 F.2d 1291 (1st Cir. 1988).
106. Id. at 1293. The case involved the liability of the Chase Manhattan
Bank for deposits in a Cuban branch. Id. at 1291-92. The suit was filed under
The Edge Act, 12 U.S.C. § 632 (1988). 861 F.2d at 1294 n.14. The court
acknowledged that when jurisdiction is not based on diversity of citizenship,
the Klaxon rule does not necessarily apply. Id. See supra note 103 for an
explanation of Klaxon.
107. 861 F.2d at 1295. The court applied the choice of law principles in §
6 of the Restatement, which provides:
(1) A court, subject to constitutional restrictions, will follow a
statutory directive of its own state on choice of law
(2) When there is no such directive, the factors relevant to the
choice of law include
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems,
(b) the relevant policies of the forum,
(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the
relative interests of those states in the determination of the
particular issue,
(d) the protection of justified expectations,
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law,
(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and
(g) ease in the determination and application of the law to
be applied.
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1988). See also Sandefer
Oil & Gas, Inc., v. AIG Oil Rig, Inc., 846 F.2d 319, 322 (5th Cir. 1988)
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Restatement generally requires application of a statute of limi-
tations derived from the law of the forum, even when the suit
would be time-barred under the limitation period in the juris-
diction where the claim arose. 08 In light of Champion Interna-
tional and Edelman, the Specialty Paperboard court incorrectly
assumed that the limitation period under the law of the state in
which the plant closed necessarily applies in all WARN actions.
B. Proposed Amendment to WARN: Three Year Statute of
Limitations
WARN requires a federal, uniform statute of limitations
because application of state law limitation periods encourages
forum shopping' °9 and fails to achieve uniformity. As the Su-
preme Court noted in Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills,"10
federal labor relations law is a matter of national concern."'
Consequently, as the Court explained in DelCostello v. Inter-
national Brotherhood of Teamsters,"2 the need for uniformity
is especially important." 3 Application of the state-borrowing
doctrine to WARN fails to provide uniform results, particularly
when a single employer closes plants in several states., 4 If federal
courts follow Specialty Paperboard and borrow limitation per-
iods from the states in which the plants close, the employees
affected by the plant closings have varying lengths of time to
file their claims."-' In determining the appropriate limitations
period for WARN suits, Congress should examine analogous
federal labor and employment laws." 6 ERISA117 is the statute
(applying the Restatement); Hoffman v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,
857 F.2d 290, 304 (6th Cir. 1988) (applying the Restatement principles for
choice of law in a case arising under a federal question).
108. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 142 (1988).
109. See supra notes 91-107 and accompanying text for a discussion of
forum shopping under WARN.
110. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
111. Id. at 453.
112. 462 U.S. 151 (1983).
113. Id. at 152.
114. American companies frequently close plants in several states simulta-
neously. See Allen Myerson, IBM Aims to Cut 25, 000 More Jobs: Sees Record
Loss, N.Y. Tams, Dec. 26, 1992, at Al; Barbara Noble, Straddling the Law
on Layoffs, N.Y. Tms, Feb. 28, 1993, § 3, at 37.
115. See supra note 81 for an illustration of the various lengths of state
contract statutes of limitations.
116. See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
relevance of other federal labor laws.
117. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
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most analogous to WARN because the statutes share common
purposes" s and include many of the same provisions." 9
ERISA, enacted in 1974, provides a uniform national system
to regulate employee pension and benefit plans.' 20 Congress
enacted the statute because few employees were actually receiving
the pension benefits they expected.1 21 ERISA protects employee
benefit plans by imposing a minimum funding requirement on
most private plans. 22 The statute includes vesting requirements
that protect employee benefits from forfeiture. 23 ERISA also
provides for pension plan termination insurance 24 and federal
fiduciary standards which require plan administrators to invest
funds in accordance with the interests of employees.12' Under
ERISA, employees can file suit to enforce the Act's provisions
in federal or state court.'2 Employees alleging a breach of
fiduciary duty by their employer or plan administrator must file
suit within three years after they acquire actual knowledge of
the breach. 27
118. See infra notes 128-31 for a discussion of the purposes of WARN and
ERISA.
119. See infra notes 127-37 for a discussion of similar provisions in WARN
and ERISA.
120. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-
406, 88 Stat. 832 (1974) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988
& Supp. IV 1992)). A detailed discussion of ERISA is beyond the scope of
this Recent Development. For a general overview of ERISA, see JAMEs 0.
CASTAGNERA & DAVID A. LITTEL, FEDERAL REGULATION OF EMPLOYEE BENEFITS
35-81 (1992); Leslie Wellman & Shari J. Clark, An Overview of Pension
Benefit and Fiduciary Litigation Under ERISA, 26 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 665
(1990).
121. HousE Comm. ON EDUCATION AND LABOR, EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT
INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974, H.R. Doc. No. 533, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1
(1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639.
122. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1081-1086 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
123. Id. §§ 1051-1053.
124. Id. §§ 1001-1168, 1301-1453.
125. Id. §§ 1101-1114.
126. Id. § 1132.
127. The statute of limitations for breach of fiduciary duty provides:
No action may be commenced under this subchapter with respect
to a fiduciary's breach of any responsibility, duty, or obligation
under this part, or with respect to a violation of this part, after
the earlier of -
(1) six years after (A) the date of the last action which constituted
a part of the breach or violation, or (B) in the case of an omission,
the latest date on which the fiduciary could have cured the breach
or violation, or
(2) three years after the earliest date on which the plaintiff had
actual knowledge of the breach or violation;
except that in the case of fraud or concealment, such action may
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Plant closings always raise concerns regarding employee ben-
efit plans. In fact, Congress enacted ERISA primarily to ensure
that employees affected by plant closings would receive their
expected benefits.'2 In enacting ERISA, Congress also sought
to maintain a mobile workforce. 29 Before ERISA, the fear of
lost benefits prevented many employees from switching employ-
ers. 130 As with ERISA, Congress passed WARN to allow workers
affected by plant closings to obtain positions with other com-
panies.' Section 5 of WARN expressly refers to ERISA, which
further indicates the close relationship between plant closings
and employee benefit plans.3 2
In addition to sharing common purposes, ERISA and WARN
contain many of the same provisions. Both statutes provide
good faith exceptions that allow employers to avoid liability. 33
Also, the venue provision of ERISA bears a close resemblance
to WARN's section 4.114 WARN requires employers to notify
be commenced not later than six years after the date of discovery
of such breach or violation.
29 U.S.C. § 1113. This Recent Development proposes a three-year statute of
limitations for WARN because, when a plant closes, employees necessarily
have actual knowledge that their employers failed to provide advance notice.
By its plain language, the limitation period provided in § 1113 applies only
to suits alleging a breach of fiduciary duty. No other cause of action under
ERISA has a specific statute of limitations. Federal courts have generally
borrowed a limitation period from state law for causes of action under an
ERISA provision other than the fiduciary duty section. See generally Todd
M. Worscheck, Eighth Circuit Struggles to Select Appropriate Statute of
Limitations for ERISA Claims: Difficulties with a Straightforward Matter, 18
WM. MITcIELL U. RE v. 861 (proposing a uniform statute of limitations for
ERISA in order to eliminate forum shopping).
128. HousE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME
SECURITY ACT OF 1974, H.R. Doc. No. 807, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1974),
reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4670, 4680. See also JOHN LANOBEIN & BRUCE
WOLK, PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEnT LAW 55 (1990). Specifically, the widely
publicized closure of a Studebaker auto plant in South Bend, Indiana caused
nearly 4400 employees to lose their pensions. H.R. Doc. No. 807, supra.
129. See WILLIAM GREENOUGH & FRANCIS KING, PENSION PLANS AND PUBLIC
POLICY 155 (1976).
130. Id.
131. See supra note 4 and accompanying text for the purposes behind
WARN.
132. WARN § 5(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 2104(a)(1)(B) (1988).
133. WARN's good faith provision (WARN § 3(b)(1)) is codified at §
2102(b)(1). See supra note 41 for the text of that section. ERISA's good faith
provision is found at 29 U.S.C. § 1108.
134. The venue provision of ERISA provides:
Where an action under this subchapter is brought in a district
court of the United States, it may be brought in the district where
the plan is administered, where the breach took place, or where
a defendant resides or may be found, and process may be servedhttps://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol46/iss1/14
LIMITATIONS PERIOD UNDER WARN
government officials prior to closing a plant.'35 ERISA includes
a similar provision,' 36 which requires an employer to notify
government officials prior to termination of a benefit plan. 13
7
Although any federal statute of limitations would eliminate
forum shopping and achieve uniformity, the Specialty Paper-
board court correctly rejected the NLRA and the FLSA as
sources from which to derive a limitation period for WARN.
31
By enacting WARN, Congress recognized the hardships employ-
ees experience when their company ceases operations. 3 9 The
affected employees suffer financial hardship due to a loss of
income'40 and must seek alternative employment.' 4' The NLRA
six-month statute of limitations' 42 provides an inadequate time
period for employees affected by a plant closing to file a lawsuit.
Faced with a loss of income, it is unlikely that the employees
will have enough money to finance a lawsuit within six months
of the plant closing.
Employees who file a complaint under the NLRA or the
FLSA do not face excessive litigation expenses because federal
agencies exist to enforce those statutes. 43 The agencies process
the complaint at no cost to the employee.'4 Moreover, the
shorter FLSA statute of limitations is justified because employees
know their rights under that statute. The FLSA requires em-
ployers to post notices informing employees of the minimum
wage.145 Conversely, few employees know their WARN rights.'4
in any other district where a defendant resides or may be found.
29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(2) (1988). See supra note 8 for text of the WARN venue
provision.
135. 29 U.S.C. § 2102(a) (1988). See supra note 39 for text of WARN's
government notice provision.
136. 29 U.S.C. § 1341(a) (1988).
137. Id. Notice must be given to the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation,
a unit of the Department of Labor that establishes procedures for terminating
pension plans. 29 U.S.C. § 1302 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
138. See supra notes 57-90 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
Specialty Paperboard decision.
139. For a discussion of the purposes of WARN, see supra notes 1-4 and
accompanying text.
140. See AnouD, supra note 1, at v.
141. See Effectiveness of WARN, supra note 2, at 3-8.
142. 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1988).
143. See supra notes 72-73 for citations to the relevant statutory provisions.
144. See supra notes 72-73.
145. 29 C.F.R. § 697 (1993).
146. See Effectiveness of WARN, supra note 2, at 15. The two-year statute
of limitations provided by FLSA, however, is not as objectionable as the
NLRA six-month limitation period. The primary benefit of using ERISA
instead of the FLSA as the source of a uniform limitation period for WARN
is that a three-year statute of limitations would streamline litigation.
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In addition, neither the NLRA nor the FLSA were enacted to
protect employees from the effects of a plant closing.147 A three-
year statute of limitations under WARN would provide employ-
ees affected by a plant closing sufficient time to seek alternative
employment, acquire information regarding their statutory rights,
and obtain the financial resources necessary to file suit.
Amending WARN to include the same statute of limitations
as ERISA would streamline litigation because plant closings and
layoffs may trigger both ERISA and WARN suits.148 If the two
statutes shared a limitation period, courts could easily determine
the timeliness of WARN and ERISA claims simultaneously.
V. CONCLUSION AND PROPOSED AMENDMENT
Congress could eliminate forum shopping by specifying a
statute of limitations for lawsuits under WARN. A uniform,
easily identifiable limitations period would eliminate the waste
of judicial resources presently devoted to determining the proper
time limit. A statute of limitations amendment would require
little congressional effort, particularly because members of Con-
gress have already introduced other bills to amend WARN. 149
Consequently, Congress should amend WARN as follows:
No action may be commenced under this title with
respect to the advance notice requirements of section
2102 more than three years after the date upon which
employees suffer an employment loss as a result of a
plant closing or mass layoff.
Jon A. Ray*
147. The stated purpose of the NLRA is "to protect the rights of individual
employees in their relations with labor organizations." 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1988).
The FLSA was enacted in 1935, in response to labor conditions which were
"detrimental to the ... health, efficiency, and general well-being of workers."
29 U.S.C. § 202(a).
148. See, e.g., James v. Fleet/Norstar Fin. Group, 992 F.2d 463 (2d Cir.
1993); Local 217, Hotel & Restaurant Employees Union v. MHM, Inc., 976
F.2d 805 (2d Cir. 1992); Adcox v. Teledyne, Inc., 810 F. Supp. 909 (N.D.
Ohio 1992).
149. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
bills presently before Congress.
* J.D. 1994, Washington University.https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol46/iss1/14
